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PERSONAL ANTI-THEISM AND  
THE MEANINGFUL LIFE ARGUMENT
Myron A. Penner
In a recent paper, Guy Kahane asks whether God’s existence is something we 
should want to be true. Expanding on some cryptic remarks from Thomas 
Nagel, Kahane’s informative and wide-ranging piece eventually addresses 
whether personal anti-theism is justified, where personal anti-theism is the 
view that God’s existence would make things worse overall for oneself. In 
what follows, I develop, defend, but ultimately reject the Meaningful Life 
Argument, according to which if God’s existence precludes the realization 
of certain goods that seem to an agent to constitute a meaningful life, it is 
rational for an agent both to believe that personal anti-theism is true and to 
prefer that God not exist.
Introduction
In a recent paper, Guy Kahane asks whether God’s existence is something 
we should want to be true.1 Expanding on some cryptic remarks from 
Thomas Nagel,2 Kahane’s informative and wide-ranging piece eventually 
addresses whether personal anti-theism is justified, where personal anti-
theism is the view that God’s existence would make things worse overall 
for oneself. In what follows, I build on the argument-sketch Kahane 
presents in support of personal anti-theism and develop The Meaningful 
Life Argument.3 The essence of the Meaningful Life Argument is that if 
God’s existence precludes the realization of certain goods that seem to an 
agent to constitute a meaningful life, it is rational for that agent both to 
believe that personal anti-theism is true and to prefer that God not exist. 
After presenting the Meaningful Life Argument and showing how its 
1Guy Kahane, “Should We Want God to Exist?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 
82 (2011), 674–696. Kahane utilizes a classical theistic concept of God in his paper, and that’s 
the concept of God I’ll have in view as well.
2Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 160, states “I hope 
there is no God! I don’t want there to be a God; I don’t want the universe to be like that,” 
quoted in Kahane, 679. For another expansion of themes addressed by Nagel, see Stephen 
T. Davis, “On Preferring that God Not Exist (Or that God Exist): A Dialogue,” Faith and Phi-
losophy 31 (2014), 143–159.
3More precisely, what I’ll develop is an argument template, because two of the premises 
contain open variables. I then consider a particular instance of this using Kahane’s substitu-
tion instances for these variables.
pp. 325–337 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 32 No. 3 July 2015
doi: 10.5840/faithphil201563039
All rights reserved
326 Faith and Philosophy
premises can be defended, I raise some objections to show that, although 
the Meaningful Life Argument is ultimately unsuccessful, it illuminates 
some important insights concerning the rationality of using one’s prefer-
ences for discerning a meaningful life in the absence or presence of God.
I. On Preferring that God Exists
The question of what value God’s existence would add to the world is 
interesting in that disagreeing about whether God exists doesn’t preclude 
rational agreement about whether God’s existence would add value to the 
world. For example, it’s neither extraordinary nor obviously irrational for 
an atheist to find herself thinking the following:
Well, I don’t believe in a God, but I wish there were a God. I can see how 
things would be better in certain respects, and perhaps better overall, if 
there were a God. If God—an all-powerful and super-good agent—were 
real, that would seem to entail that the world isn’t as meaningless or 
paradoxical as it appears to be. There’d be some sense of divine cosmic 
justice according to which things eventually get balanced out, even if 
the way this gets worked out is hidden at present. Now, I don’t for a 
moment believe that God is real. Thinking “It would be good X exists” 
is no basis for thinking that X is real. But still, it’d be nice if there were a 
super-good, super-powerful agent managing things toward some kind 
of good, ultimate end.
Following Kahane, we can call this view that God’s existence would add 
value to the world, pro-theism.4
Kahane describes a different perspective on the value—in this case, the 
negative impact—God’s existence would have on the world:
If a striving for independence, understanding, privacy and solitude is so 
inextricably woven into my identity that its curtailment by God’s existence 
would not merely make my life worse but rob it of meaning, then perhaps I 
can reasonably prefer that God not exist—reasonably treat God’s existence 
as undesirable without having to think of it as impersonally bad or as merely 
setting back too many of my interests. The thought is that in a world where 
complete privacy is impossible, where one is subordinated to a superior be-
ing, certain kinds of life plans, aspirations, and projects cannot make sense. 
. . . Theists sometime claim that if God does not exist, life has no meaning. 
I am now suggesting that if God does exist, the life of at least some would 
lose its meaning.5
4Kahane, “Should We Want God to Exist?,” 694. Klaas Kraay and Chris Dragos explicate 
the term more fully and locate pro-theism in relation to a number of other options in logical 
space with respect to God’s existence and the value God’s existence could add to a world; 
see Klaas Kraay and Chris Dragos, “On Preferring God’s Non-existence,” Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 43 (2013), 157–178.
5Kahane, “Should We Want God to Exist?,” 691–692.
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According to Kahane, this “is the strongest defense of Nagel’s wish” that 
the universe not include the existence of God.6
Given that theists typically think of God as a necessary being, one might 
wonder whether there’s a meaningful sense according to which theists 
and atheists can entertain comparisons between worlds Wn and Wm where 
God is said to exist in Wn but not in Wm. However, if God is a necessary 
being, then either God exists in every world or in no world at all. Thus for 
theists, the conditional “If God doesn’t exist, then my life would be more 
meaningful than if God does exist” is a counterpossible: a counterfactual 
with a necessarily false antecedent, and unpacking the meaningfulness 
of counterpossibles is notoriously tricky.7 Kahane recognizes the problem 
of counterpossibles, but isn’t too concerned about whether this prevents 
meaningfully comparing God-inclusive and God-exclusive worlds.8 While 
a foray into the semantics of counterpossibles would take us too far afield, 
I will adopt Kahane’s assumption that “we can intelligibly value necessi-
ties and impossibilities” in the way implied by counterpossibles.9
II. The Meaningful Life Argument
II.1. Kahane’s Argument
The phrase “meaningful life” is one of those common expressions that 
seems to be well understood even though rarely defined, perhaps in part 
because it is difficult to do so, and perhaps in part because lacking a precise 
definition doesn’t preclude ability to understand, roughly, the meaning of 
the term. A detailed attempt to specify what constitutes a meaningful life 
is beyond the scope of this paper. However, by the phrase “meaningful 
life,” I simply mean something along the lines of “what an ideal rational 
agent would say, on reflection, makes a life worth living.”10
6Ibid., 692. 
7For some recent work on counterpossibles and their implications for theism, see Wes 
Morriston “What if God Commanded Something Terrible? A Problem for Divine Command 
Theorists,” Religious Studies 45 (2009), 249–267; see also Richard Brian Davis and W. Paul 
Franks, “Counterpossibles and the ‘Terrible’ Divine Command Deity” Religious Studies 
(forthcoming).
8Kahane, “Should We Want God to Exist,” 672, states:
If, as some theists claim, it is a necessary truth that God exists, or if, as some athe-
ists claim, the very concept of God is incoherent, then such attitudes towards God’s 
existence or inexistence would be attitudes towards necessities or impossibilities. 
In what follows, I shall assume that we can intelligibly value necessities and im-
possibilities in the way implied by claims like [“It would be exceedingly bad if 
God does not exist,” and “It would be exceedingly good if God exists”].
9T. J. Mawson thinks that distinguishing between metaphysically possible worlds and 
logically possible worlds will allow for a meaningful way to draw comparisons with worlds 
picked out by the antecedents of counterpossibles; see T. J. Mawson, “On Determining How 
Important it is Whether or not There is a God,” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 
(2012), 95–105.
10Analytic philosophers have been paying increasing attention to the question of whether 
or how life is meaningful. Not surprisingly, much attention has been given to clarify and 
understand precisely what the question “What is the meaning of life?” means. A detailed 
answer to that question is beyond the scope of this paper. For excellent surveys of key is-
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In the following section, I develop the argument sketched by Kahane 
above and convert a version of it into a standard logical format. We’ll need 
to have two preliminary concepts in view in order to present the argument. 
First, let moral goods be those goods that only moral agents are able to expe-
rience or pursue in virtue of their being moral agents. Second, let’s stipulate 
that for some agents, striving for, and perhaps obtaining, a meaningful 
life, depends on obtaining or pursuing some moral goods. This stipulation 
allows us to identify the following set: let “MS” name the set of moral goods 
such that from some agent S’s perspective, obtaining or pursuing the goods 
in MS is necessary for S to have a meaningful life. Introducing the set MS 
captures the idea Kahane expresses at various points in his paper: namely, 
the role of life-plans in determining a meaningful life, and both the good of 
pursuing one’s plan for one’s life and the absurdity of a life in which one is 
unable to pursue what one deems to be a life worth living.11
We’re now in a position to present the Meaningful Life Argument Tem-
plate:
The Meaningful Life Argument Template
1. If God’s existence would constrain or prevent S from obtaining 
some of the goods in MS, then God’s existence would constrain or 
prevent S from obtaining what she thinks is a meaningful life.
2. If God’s existence would constrain or prevent S from obtaining what 
she thinks is a meaningful life, then it’s rational for S to prefer that 
God doesn’t exist.
3. So, if God’s existence would constrain or prevent S from obtaining 
some of the goods in MS, then it’s rational for S to prefer that God 
doesn’t exist.
4. God’s existence would constrain or prevent S from obtaining some 
of the goods in MS.
5. Thus, it’s rational for S to prefer that God doesn’t exist.
II.2. Defense of Premises
(1) is true on the description of MS given above. According to that de-
scription, pursuing the goods in MS is a necessary condition for S to have 
a meaningful life. Thus, if God’s existence prevents or constrains S from 
satisfying this necessary condition, then God’s existence prevents or con-
strains S from obtaining a meaningful life, just as (1) states.
sues and recent contributions in the “meaning of life” literature, see Thaddeus Metz, “New 
Developments in the Meaning of Life,” Philosophy Compass 2 (2007), 196–217, and Thaddeus 
Metz, Meaning in Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); see also Joshua Seachris, Ex-
ploring the Meaning of Life: An Anthology and Guide (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2013), and Eric J. 
Wielenberg, Virtue and Value in a Godless Universe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 16–23.
11Kahane, “Should We Want God to Exist?,” 691–693.
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One might wonder what it means to “constrain or prevent S from 
obtaining the goods in MS” such that “God’s existence would constrain 
or prevent S from obtaining what she thinks is a meaningful life.” For 
example, suppose a meaningful life arises from achieving some good g to 
a degree or threshold n, even though it’s possible for any person to experi-
ence g to a magnitude of 2 n. In that case, God’s constraining S’s experience 
of g to, say, an order of 1.5 n would be a scenario in which the antecedent of 
(1) obtains, but not the consequent. As such, I’m going to stipulate that by 
“constrain or prevent S from obtaining the goods in MS” I mean in a way 
that precludes S from having a meaningful life.
(2) is true based on a plausible assumption about rational preference: 
namely, that it’s rational to prefer the pursuit of a meaningful life, a life 
deemed worth living, over alternatives. However, a scenario raised by 
Klaas Kraay calls this principle into question by presenting two cases in 
which the antecedent of (2) is true but it seems that the consequent is false:
Suppose S thinks that God’s existence would render S’s life meaning-
less but would also completely ensure S’s children’s eternal blissful 
afterlife. Is it then rational for S to prefer God’s nonexistence? That 
might seem awfully selfish. A more dramatic example: what if God’s 
existence makes S’s life meaningless, but makes the world as a whole 
significantly, even infinitely better off? Then it might be rationally per-
missible—perhaps even rationally obligatory—for S to prefer theism.12
Are these cases in which God’s existence prevents or constrains S from 
obtaining a meaningful life and yet it still remains irrational, and perhaps 
morally blameworthy, to prefer atheism? Both cases have the common 
feature that one’s failing to achieve a meaningful life results in some great 
good for another person—either the good of one’s children’s eternal bliss, 
or infinite good experienced by the rest of the world as a whole. This fea-
ture of the cases is worth considering in some detail.
For simplicity, let’s name the putative good of contributing to others’ 
bliss other-bliss. Now either S’s manifesting other-bliss will be meaning-
conferring for S or it won’t. That is, either S’s exemplifying this property 
will contribute to the meaning of S’s life13 or it won’t. If other-bliss does 
contribute to the meaning of S’s life, then Kraay’s cases collapse into inco-
herence, for they generate the following contradiction: S’s life has meaning 
(because it contains other-bliss) and S’s life is meaningless (for God has 
rendered it so by hypothesis). Thus, the only way to make the cases intel-
ligible is to assume that other-bliss will not be meaning-conferring.
It does seem at first glance that if other-bliss is not meaning-conferring, 
then we do have a counter-example to premise (2) of the Meaningful 
Life Argument. However, determining whether these sorts of cases are 
genuine counter-examples will require further discussion about the 
12Raised in correspondence.
13Making other-bliss a member of MS.
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plausibility, on theism, of God’s rendering anyone’s life meaningless, let 
alone of God’s securing the bliss of others only through the meaningless 
existence of another’s life. For example, both theists and non-theists might 
argue that Kraay’s cases seem to contradict the theistic concept of God’s 
perfect goodness,14 in which case Kraay’s cases collapse into incoherence 
once again by generating a contradiction, albeit a different contradiction 
than the one considered above. Here the contradiction would be: God (by 
hypothesis a perfectly good being) performs an action demonstrating that 
God is not a perfectly good being. Another strategy available to the pro-
ponent of the Meaningful Life Argument is to argue that the disjunct we 
are now considering—S’s choosing a life that exemplifies other-bliss even 
though her own life is rendered meaningless as a result—is inconsistent 
with any substantive model of what constitutes a meaningful life. Consider 
my generic slogan according to which a meaningful life is what an ideal 
agent would, on reflection, consider to make life worth living. On that ac-
count, preferring a life that contained other-bliss even though one’s own life 
is meaningless—an implication of Kraay’s cases—is deemed meaningful. 
Thus, as interesting as Kraay’s cases are, more work needs to be done in 
order to determine whether they constitute genuine counter-examples to 
(2) of the Meaningful Life Argument.
While (3) follows from (1) and (2) based on logical form, (4) is more 
controversial, for according to it there are some moral goods such that 
God’s existence would constrain or prevent a moral agent S from ob-
taining them. Recall that Kahane’s substitution candidates for such goods 
are independence, understanding, privacy, and solitude. In order for these 
candidates to be legitimate substitution instances for the goods mentioned 
in (4), two further claims need to be established for each putative moral 
good. First, it would need to be established that each putative moral good 
is in fact a moral good. And second, it would need to be established that 
God’s existence would prevent or constrain some moral agent S from ob-
taining that moral good.
II.3. Kahane’s Candidates
Let’s address these two questions for each of Kahane’s candidates, with the 
understanding that I won’t commit myself to any particular meta-ethical 
theory. Instead, I’ll make some general observations about what each of 
Kahane’s candidates has going for it such that there’s good reason to think 
that they can be embedded within a variety of meta-ethical theories.
Consider a parallel example concerning the moral good of truth-telling. 
Truth-telling is a good candidate for a moral good precisely because it 
can easily be accommodated (with certain qualifications) in a variety of 
normative theories. We typically prefer being told the truth to being lied 
14Especially if one adopts Marilyn Adams’s view that God is good to a person if, and 
only if, God guarantees to a person a life that is, on balance, a great good to that person; 
see Marilyn Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 2000).
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to. Even though we may sometimes not like the content of what is truth-
fully told to us, when told something at all, we typically prefer that it be 
told in truth. Thus, reciprocity and fairness, also widely held features that 
factor into ethical systems, dictate that I not only prefer truth-telling but 
that I practice it as well. To be sure, deontological, consequentialist, virtue, 
or divine-command accounts of morality will each give different accounts 
for how truth-telling fits the meta-ethical facts, but that truth-telling can 
be so accommodated is a feature which indicates that truth-telling is a 
moral good.
The only meta-ethical theory off limits for the sequel is any view ac-
cording to which all value is grounded in God. This is consistent with the 
approach taken by Kahane who observes that “If you believed that God is 
the source of value, and that God does not exist, then you would have no 
reason to prefer either God’s existence or His non-existence. You would 
have no reason to prefer anything.”15 I’m going to assume that many 
claims that stem from our ethical intuitions and inferences can be accom-
modated by a variety of meta-ethical systems including, but not limited 
to, God-based value systems. Thus, if one doesn’t need a God-based value 
system to account for our ethical intuitions and inferences, and it’s the case 
that a God-based value system precludes our ability to rationally assess 
the Meaningful Life Argument, we shouldn’t worry about how Kahane’s 
candidates square with God-based moral systems.16
With this background, let’s consider the putative moral good of inde-
pendence. Independence is typically associated with goods like control, 
autonomy, and the ability to determine one’s own future. Independence 
and the ability to flourish on one’s own are measures of flourishing 
adulthood. Moreover, when our independence is compromised—either 
through external factors beyond our control (e.g., unjust imprisonment, 
poor health, social constraint) or our own culpable negligence, it appears 
as though something has gone wrong. Independence has a prima facie 
plausibility as a moral good.
Would God’s existence constrain one’s ability to achieve independence? 
Yes, at least in some key respects. Theistic accounts of God as a maximally 
great being include the idea that God is both creator and sustainer of all 
that is. Creatures thus depend on God for their being brought into and 
sustained throughout their existence. As creator, God sets the purposes 
for created things such that flourishing for any creature is a function of 
conforming to or achieving the ends God has set for that creature. This 
is perhaps the most important and pervasive way in which one’s inde-
pendence is compromised if God exists, for one would always be a 
subordinate, subject to the rule of another.
15Kahane, “Should We Want God to Exist?,” 679.
16For views stressing the importance of God for coherent and comprehensive moral 
theory, see John Hare, The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1996); see also C. Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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Another way in which independence is compromised if God exists is in 
virtue of the obligations that arise in virtue of being in in the social relation 
of creature to creator. According to C. Stephen Evans:
[I]f God exists and is a genuine person, then the relation between creature 
and creator is a genuine social relation, and like other such relations, carries 
with it distinctive obligations. . . . A proper social relation with God is one 
that requires humans to recognize the enormous debt of gratitude they owe 
to God, as well as the value of an on-going relation to God. Most religious 
believers have seen this relation to God as one in which God rightly has 
authority over them. This authority might be explained in various ways, 
as stemming from God’s ownership rights as creator, or as grounded in the 
gratitude owed to God for God’s good gifts, or as grounded in the goods 
which a relation to God makes possible.17
Things get worse with respect to independence on certain theistic accounts 
that are strongly theologically determinist, where God is deemed to be the 
only efficient cause. For on such accounts, God’s sustaining creatures in 
existence entails that God is causally responsible for every feature of every 
created thing at every moment at which it exists. So, there’s good reason to 
think that independence is compromised if God exists.
Similar points could be made about the remainder of Kahane’s can-
didates: understanding, privacy, and solitude. Understanding, either 
construed merely as an increase in one’s information or more specifically 
as knowledge of certain kinds of information (e.g., virtue, wisdom, etc.), 
is a plausible candidate for a moral good because possessing informa-
tion is useful for agents as they pursue their own flourishing. Privacy, 
understood as having one’s mental states shielded from other minds, is a 
plausible good given both positive and negative features of human being. 
Positively, the ability to have one’s mental life shielded from others is a 
key component to individual agency that makes willing self-disclosure 
possible. If we lacked privacy, we would then lack agency with respect 
to self-disclosure. We could neither choose with whom to share informa-
tion about ourselves nor what information to share, and a key identifying 
marker of individuality would be lost. Negatively, the ability to have one’s 
mental life shielded from others prevents one from being associated or 
identified with one’s fleeting unsavory thoughts generated from either 
reflective or pre-reflective cognitive processes. The possibility of solitude, 
of truly being alone should we so choose, is also, plausibly, a good state of 
affairs. It’s easy to imagine examples where solitude contributes to one’s 
own well-being and, as such, being prevented from experiencing solitude 
undermines our experience of well-being.
And, as with independence, God’s existence constrains or prevents one 
from experiencing understanding, privacy, and solitude. With respect to 
17Evans, God and Moral Obligation, 28. See also Baruch Brody, “Morality and Religion 
Reconsidered,” in Readings in the Philosophy of Religion, ed. B. Brody (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1974), quoted in Wielenberg, Virtue and Value, 54.
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understanding, many theistic traditions will affirm in some sense the no-
tion of God as an infinite being, the complete comprehension of whom is 
impossible. So, if one held that the possibility of complete understanding is 
part of a meaningful life, God’s existence would entail that this good could 
never be achieved. Moreover, God’s existence would compromise one’s 
understanding in another way even if an agent doesn’t desire complete 
understanding of the world. Suppose one holds as a good that facts, if ex-
plainable, are explainable in terms of natural causes because we have some 
handle on the predictable workings of some natural phenomena and the 
laws that govern them; call this the good of universal naturalistic explana-
tion. Endorsing universal naturalistic explanation as a good doesn’t commit 
one to thinking that one will ever achieve complete understanding of the 
world. It merely commits one to thinking that the world, if explainable, 
will be explainable in terms of laws, causes, and effects that are accessible 
because, in part, they are naturalistic. However, if God exists and is a su-
pernatural agent who can and does override the natural powers of objects, 
then the good of universal naturalistic explanation cannot be achieved.
With respect to privacy, God’s omnipotence would mean that true pri-
vacy can never be achieved, for any true proposition about one’s mental 
life—including one’s belief states—would be such that God knows it. 
Things get even more invasive with respect to privacy when considering 
that not only would God have at least as much knowledge about S’s re-
flective mental life as S, God’s knowledge of S’s mental life far outstrips 
S’s own. Suppose something like the widely held dual-processing account 
of cognition is accurate. On this model, mental processes fall into one of 
two categories: System 1 (fast, automatic, unconscious) and System 2 (slow, 
reflective, conscious).18 While human cognitive agents have some access 
to the outputs of System 1 cognition (certain reflective System 2 processes 
simply “read off” the pre-reflective outputs of System 1 processes), such ac-
cess is limited. But God, presumably, would not be limited in access to the 
outputs of an agent’s pre-reflective cognitive processes. The result is that 
God is aware of all of both an agent’s pre-reflective and reflective beliefs 
even when the agent herself may have only dim reflective awareness of 
some of her pre-reflective cognitive outputs. If God exists, not only is one 
unable to shield one’s reflective mental life from God, but God’s knowledge 
of the outputs of one’s pre-reflective cognitive processes means that God is 
more aware of what creatures are thinking than are creatures themselves.
With respect to solitude, God’s omnipresence would entail that one can 
never escape the presence of God. Therefore, it would be the case that 
there is no location in space-time for a creature to occupy such that the 
creature is able to escape the presence of God.
There is a good prima facie case for independence, understanding, 
privacy, and solitude to be considered moral goods. Moreover, there is 
18See Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, “Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and 
Social Cognition,” Annual Review of Psychology 9 (2008), 255–278.
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good reason to think that God’s existence would constrain or prevent 
moral agents from experiencing those goods in any ultimate sense. Thus, 
if independence, understanding, privacy, and solitude are crucial for some 
agent’s meaningful life-plan, then given the barrier God’s existence would 
be for achieving that life-plan, it would be rational for that agent to prefer 
that God doesn’t exist.
III. Objections and Replies
III.1. The Fallibility Objection
Recall the first premise of the Meaningful Life argument:
1. If God’s existence would constrain or prevent S from obtaining the 
goods in MS, then God’s existence would constrain or prevent S 
from obtaining what she thinks is a meaningful life.
I defended this premise by appealing to the definition of the set MS, where 
MS is the set of moral goods such that from some agent S’s perspective, 
obtaining or pursuing the goods in MS is necessary for S to have what she 
thinks is a meaningful life. The consequent of (1) served as the antecedent 
in the next premise:
2. If God’s existence constrains or prevents S from obtaining what she 
thinks is a meaningful life, then it’s rational for S to prefer that God 
doesn’t exist.
There are two issues that merit further scrutiny in assessing the content 
and plausibility of (2).
First, notice that the described criteria for a meaningful life, both in the 
antecedent of (2) and in the definition of MS, are restricted to purely sub-
jective criteria. S gets to determine membership in MS based on whatever 
she thinks will constitute a meaningful life. Perhaps that determination is 
the result of S exercising reflective agency—she reflectively decides what 
is meaningful to her. Perhaps the content of MS isn’t the result of any deci-
sion on S’s part at all—perhaps her thinking MS has the content it does is 
purely a result of some combination of genetic and social conditioning. 
Regardless of how S came to believe that MS has the particular members it 
does, from S’s perspective, pursuing the goods in MS constitutes a mean-
ingful life. But unless S’s perspective is an infallible indicator of these sorts 
of things, we’ll need to acknowledge the potential gap that exists between 
S’s perspective on what constitutes a meaningful life for S, and what ac-
tually constitutes a meaningful life for S. Suppose there’s an objective, 
subject-independent fact concerning moral goods the pursuit or attaining 
of which in fact constitutes a meaningful life for S; let “*MS,” name the set 
whose members are all and only those moral goods.19
19I’m not making any claims here about whether the objective criteria for a meaningful life 
for S are the same criteria for any or all other agents.
335PERSONAL ANTI-THEISM AND THE MEANINGFUL LIFE ARGUMENT
Now a crucial question emerges: for any agent S, what’s the relation-
ship between the sets MS and *MS? A strong reason for thinking that it’s 
possible for MS and *MS to have different members is that we seem prone 
to error when it comes to determining what will constitute a meaningful 
life. The following scenario not only seems merely logically possible, but 
one that is quite common:
I used to think that pursuing and achieving goods X, Y, and Z would 
constitute a meaningful life, but it turned out I was wrong. I achieved 
goods X, Y, and Z to a high degree and on a scale beyond what I’d 
dared to dream, and yet it didn’t give me the kind of satisfying life I 
thought it would. In fact, getting the kind of life I thought I wanted 
actually seemed to make life less worth living, not more. When I look 
back and think about that time in my life, the best way to make sense 
of what was going on was that I was mistaken about what would yield 
a meaningful life. It’s not as if X, Y, and Z were meaningful for a time 
and then ceased to be meaningful because the criteria for a meaningful 
life changed over time. Instead, it seems overwhelmingly the case that 
I was just mistaken about what would generate a meaningful existence.
The upshot for assessing the Meaningful Life Argument is that we can 
now see more clearly that premises (1) and (2) focus on subjective and 
fallible judgments about what constitutes a meaningful life, and there-
fore the sense of rationality in the consequent of (2) is clearly internal 
rationality, where S’s belief that p is internally rational if p coheres and/or 
follows from S’s phenomenal or doxastic experience regardless of whether 
the experiences themselves are well-formed, epistemologically speaking. 
So, even granting premise (2) according to which God’s existence might 
make it internally rational for S to prefer that God not exist because God’s 
existence prevents S from achieving what she thinks will constitute a 
meaningful life, this is no guarantee that God’s existence would actually 
prevent S from obtaining a meaningful life. That is, (2) is consistent with 
the following proposition:
(2') If God’s existence constrains or prevents S from obtaining what she 
thinks is a meaningful life, S is still able to pursue and achieve the 
goods in *MS and have a meaningful life.
The strength of any particular version of the Meaningful Life Argument 
Template will depend on the degree of support one has for thinking that 
one has accurately identified the goods necessary for obtaining a mean-
ingful life. Given the fallibility of such judgments, more work needs to be 
done than simply articulating a purely subjective list.
III.2. The Moral Goods Objection
Recall that according to (4) of the Meaningful Life Argument:
4. God’s existence would constrain or prevent S from obtaining some 
of the goods in MS.
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Recall also that Kahane’s candidates for goods such that God’s existence 
constrains or prevents one from obtaining them were independence, 
understanding, privacy and solitude. According to the Moral Goods ob-
jection, substituting Kahane’s candidates for the goods mentioned in (4) 
results in (4)’s being true only if one requires that independence, under-
standing, privacy and solitude be experienced to an ultimate and total 
degree. However, the objector continues, there are good reasons to think 
that when it comes to these particular goods, it is better to experience them 
in proximate, restricted degrees as opposed to experiencing them in an 
ultimate, unrestricted way.
For example, consider independence. Even if God exists, one is able 
to experience a high degree of independence. When looking at typical 
development over human lifespan, one sees a progression from complete 
and total dependence on others to greater degrees of independence, and, 
relative to one’s particular end of life circumstances, a regression to fur-
ther dependence on others. Nothing about God’s existence would seem 
to preclude one from experiencing high degrees of independence and au-
tonomy. God’s existence would entail that one is dependent on another for 
one’s coming into existence, but that would be true even if there is no God, 
for no contingent human being is a completely independent being. Again, 
perhaps the most troubling consequence of God’s existence with respect to 
independence is the notion that one is, ultimately, subordinate to another. 
For if God exists, I would then be subordinate to a maximally great being 
and the facts about what constitutes a meaningful and flourishing life for 
me are determined neither by me nor by nature but by God. However, 
if my perspective on the nature of human flourishing is fallible and lim-
ited, prone to all sorts of biases that stem from shortcomings—including 
moral shortcomings—it is an open question whether subordination to a 
maximally great being is less valuable than complete autonomy. At the 
very least, it is difficult to see the immediate advantage of complete inde-
pendence from a maximally great God, if such a God indeed does exist.
God’s existence was said to compromise the good of total under-
standing in two ways: by ensuring that some aspect of the world—namely 
God—will never be understood because of God’s infinite nature, and by 
introducing an element to the world that defies predictable, naturalistic 
explanation. However, it seems unfair to uniquely blame God for the in-
ability of finite creatures to gain total understanding of the universe, for 
it’s a conceptual truth on both theism and atheism that finite creatures 
are limited.
With respect to privacy, it can be disconcerting to religious believers 
and disbelievers alike to think that one’s innermost thoughts are or have 
been laid bare to another. Religious believers can find this disconcerting 
due to feelings of shame and remorse when reflecting on one’s own evil 
thoughts, either spontaneous or calculated, and subsequently believing 
that God knows all. No one likes to be “found out,” particularly if one has 
reason to think that a violation of privacy gives another information about 
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oneself that will be utilized in a negative way. However, is privacy really 
that significant a good when the “privacy invader” is God, a perfectly 
good moral agent? It doesn’t seem so. One’s inability to shield informa-
tion doesn’t result in God’s compromising God’s moral agency, and thus is 
nothing to be feared. A more remarkable good on theism, more significant 
than the good of privacy, would be the good of a perfectly good God who 
knows finite creatures in every respect, including the darkness of their 
own hearts, and yet still acts lovingly toward them.
With respect to solitude, it’s true that God’s omnipresence entails that 
one can never be truly alone. However, it is interesting to compare the 
concept of God’s omnipresence with concerns and reflections on God’s 
apparent hiddenness.20 Many wish to have a deeper awareness of the 
presence of God, if any there be, and yet are unable to attain that aware-
ness. Thus, it would seem that while in a metaphysical sense, complete 
and utter solitude is impossible if God exists, one is still able to experience 
a high degree of solitude.
Conclusion
Personal anti-theism is the view that God’s existence would make life 
worse overall for oneself. The Meaningful Life Argument shows one way 
in which personal anti-theism could be justified. However, the Mean-
ingful Life Argument can only possibly deliver the relatively low-grade 
justification that stems from a subject’s having internally rational beliefs. 
Moreover, as we’ve seen by looking at Kahane’s candidates for goods such 
that God’s existence precludes obtaining them to a maximal degree, pre-
senting any candidates for such goods requires further support to show 
that obtaining those goods in a way that God’s existence would prevent is 
worthwhile for obtaining a meaningful life.21
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